Is removal of a leader during a crisis usually a tactic by the elite to preserve the regime, not dismantle it?

Introduction Authoritarian regimes often rely on a strong, personalised figurehead - whether military strongman, monarch, or party leader - around whom symbolic authority and control are concentrated. During crises, the removal or resignation of such a figure may appear to signal democratic transition or regime collapse. However, closer analysis reveals that in many cases, the leader’s removal is a tactical concession by regime elites, designed to protect the system by sacrificing the individual. This answer argues that elite-driven removal of a leader is often a controlled decapitation aimed at demobilising protest, satisfying foreign pressure, and maintaining elite continuity. 1. The "Lamb Sacrifice" Strategy In periods of escalating unrest, regime elites face a legitimacy crisis. Removing the top figure can serve multiple purposes: Defuse protests by meeting public demands superficially. Preserve institutions (military, intelligence, ruling party). Reset external diplomacy with foreign governments demanding reform. This "sacrificial" logic follows what O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) described in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: negotiated transitions often begin with a "hardliner-softliner" split, and concessions (like leader removal) aim to control the transition process. Examples: Egypt (2011): Mubarak’s ousting was orchestrated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to redirect public anger and maintain military control of the state. Sudan (2019): Bashir was removed by military insiders to preserve their own role, leading to a military-led transition council. Algeria (2019): Bouteflika’s resignation was engineered by the military to protect the ruling elite; power merely shifted within the same network. In each case, the regime survived in a new form, minus its symbolic head. 2. Elite Preservation vs Regime Change Regimes are not just individuals - they are networks of bureaucracies, business elites, security institutions, and party structures. Leaders are sometimes liabilities to these structures. When: A leader loses credibility domestically or internationally, Becomes too autocratic even for allies, Or is seen as an obstacle to elite cohesion, the elite may pre-empt revolution by removing them, in a bid to manage change and safeguard core interests. > Slater (2010) argues that elites often form “protection pacts” to defend their interests, and will jettison leaders to uphold these pacts when necessary. 3. Controlled Transitions and Recycled Power Post-leader regimes often preserve key elements: The same ruling party (e.g. Tunisia’s Nidaa Tounes post-Ben Ali). The same military or security figures. Legal impunity for former officials. Elections managed or influenced by the old elite. This pattern is called a “pacted” or “negotiated transition”, where authoritarian actors retain veto power during reform. > See Karl (1990) on "pacted democracies", where old regimes shape the boundaries of change. Conclusion Removing a leader amid crisis is rarely a genuine concession to popular will. More often, it is a strategic manoeuvre by regime insiders to protect their institutional power and limit systemic change. By blaming the leader for repression or mismanagement, they seek to rebrand the regime without restructuring it. While such moves may open space for limited reform, they frequently result in authoritarian resilience, not collapse. The ousting of a leader is not necessarily the fall of a regime - but its survival tactic. References O'Donnell, Guillermo & Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Johns Hopkins University Press. Slater, Dan (2010). Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Karl, Terry Lynn (1990). Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 23(1), 1–21. Brownlee, Jason (2007). Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge University Press. Albrecht, Holger (2015). The Myth of Coup-proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’État in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2013. Armed Forces & Society, 41(4), 659–687.