Can mass mobilisation alone topple authoritarian regimes without elite splits or foreign acquiescence?

Introduction Mass mobilisation has long been a central feature of popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes. From the fall of the Shah in Iran to the Arab Spring, crowds in the streets have been interpreted as a sign of regime vulnerability. However, whether mobilisation alone - without elite splits or shifts in foreign support - can bring down entrenched authoritarian regimes remains contested. This answer explores the necessary conditions for regime collapse and argues that mass mobilisation, while often necessary, is rarely sufficient without a concurrent fracture in elite cohesion and at least tacit foreign acquiescence. 1. Mass Mobilisation as a Trigger, Not a Cause Mobilisation often functions as a trigger that exposes contradictions within the regime but does not, by itself, dismantle power. The key variable is how the coercive apparatus (military, police, intelligence) responds. In regimes where the elite remains united and the security forces loyal, even large-scale mobilisation tends to be crushed or co-opted. > Bellin (2004) calls this the "robustness of the coercive apparatus", identifying factors such as patrimonialism, oil wealth, and foreign support that insulate coercive institutions from societal pressure. Examples include: China (Tiananmen 1989): Massive mobilisation ended in massacre, as the PLA stayed loyal. Iran (2009 Green Movement): Millions protested, but the IRGC and Basij remained intact. Belarus (2020): Protests reached historic scale, yet Lukashenko held on through force and elite unity. 2. Elite Splits: The Decisive Factor Where regimes have fallen, it has almost always followed a split in the ruling coalition - typically in the military or political elite. Such splits signal to protestors that repression may falter and to bystanders that the regime is vulnerable. > Geddes, Wright & Frantz (2018) emphasise the role of “intra-elite fragmentation” in regime breakdown, especially in personalist and military regimes. Examples: Romania (1989): Ceaușescu’s regime collapsed only after the army refused to fire on protestors and switched sides. Chile (1988): The regime's internal rules were turned against it when Air Force General Matthei and others refused to support Pinochet’s self-coup. Sudan (2019): Bashir’s removal was ordered by his own military officers to preserve their institutional power. 3. Foreign Acquiescence and Pressure Foreign powers often act as external enablers or brakes on regime survival. U.S. or EU support to autocracies - financial, military, or diplomatic - often helps them outlast unrest. Conversely, when key foreign patrons withdraw support, the regime may become isolated and more vulnerable to elite defection or reform. > Levitsky & Way (2010) term this “linkage and leverage”: regimes with strong Western ties are more vulnerable to foreign pressure during crises. Examples: Philippines (1986): U.S. withdrawal of support helped push Marcos out after mass protests and a military defection. Egypt (2011): U.S. hesitation and public pressure helped ease Mubarak’s exit, after the army turned against him. Chile (1988): The Reagan administration distanced itself from Pinochet and pressured for democratic transition. Conclusion While mass mobilisation is often a visible and galvanising force in authoritarian crises, it is almost never independently sufficient to topple regimes. The fall of autocrats nearly always depends on a combination of elite fracture, particularly within coercive institutions, and at least passive foreign acquiescence. Without these, even the largest protest movements can be repressed, ignored, or outlasted. Thus, regime change under authoritarianism is less about popular revolt alone, and more about strategic shifts within power centres that the revolt may provoke but not command. References Bellin, Eva (2004). The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Politics, 36(2), 139–157. Geddes, Barbara; Wright, Joseph; Frantz, Erica (2018). How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse. Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Thompson, Mark R. (2016). Authoritarian Modernism and Elite Defection: The Philippines 1986 and Indonesia 1998. Journal of Democracy, 27(3), 126–140. Way, Lucan A. (2005). Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. World Politics, 57(2), 231–261.